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OUT OF THE CHANNEL AND INTO THE SWAMP:
HOW FAMILY LAW FAILS IN A NEW ERA OF
CLASS DIVISION
June Carbone*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Carl Schneider's 1992 article in the Hofstra Law Review, The
ChannellingFunction in Family Law, is part of the canon of family law.'
It has earned a lasting place in the family law constellation, at least in
part, because it stakes out a distinctive claim for the role of law in family
governance. The article identifies the role of family law as an
intermediate one that falls short of the coercion of criminal sanctions but
is more directive than the voluntary obligations taken on in contractual
regimes.2 The channelling function allies family law with public
purposes, implemented through private associations.3 It recognizes
understandings that protect the vulnerable without undermining the
authority of the powerful or negating the possibility of individual
choice.4 Above all, Schneider made the case for the role of law in
channelling the behavior necessary to build, shape, sustain, and promote
social institutions.5
Schneider maintained that a culture survives through "the power of
its institutions to bind and loose men in the conduct of their affairs with
reasons which sink so deep into the self that they become common and
* Edward A. Smith/Missouri Professor of Law, the Constitution and Society, University of
Missouri-Kansas City. I would like to thank Naomi Cahn, Nancy Levit, and Joanna Grossman for
their comments on an earlier draft of this Article. I would also like to acknowledge John Gregory's
graciousness and inspiration over the course of my career. I would also like to thank Anika
Hickman for her research support.
1. Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495
(1992).
2. Id.at 504 (describing the channelling function of family law as a means for promoting
social institutions that does not primarily use legal coercion).
3. See id.
at 507.
4. See id.
at 497-98, 502-03, 513.
5. See id. at 498, 503.
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implicitly understood.",6 These institutions help create a sense of
"commonality"; that is, "some sense that their fellow citizens are people
like themselves, whose experiences, concerns, and interests they can at
least understand and to some degree share.", 7 Institutions promote this
sense of commonality by expressing shared norms, articulating public
purposes, shaping behavior and making it more predictable, guiding
changes that reconcile older institutions with new realities or
convictions, resolving disputes, and reconciling individual cases with
broader notions of justice.8 Underlying the channelling function and
central to its success is the link between institutions and shared
understandings, expectations, and purposes. 9
In this Article, I plan to challenge whether the channelling function
of family law is still possible; that is, whether it is possible today to
create shared meanings able to serve as the foundation for institutions
constitutive of community in the United States as a whole. In making
this claim, I will argue that three factors have effectively dismantled the
channelling function of family law as Schneider defined it in 1992. The
first is family change. Change, as Schneider noted, need not inevitably
undermine the channelling function; indeed, it arguably makes it more
important as legal decisions reconcile new developments with old
institutions, expressing changed norms that permit institutions to retain
their vitality.10 Family law has often played such a role. The change
from a maternal preference in custody decision-making to norms of
shared custody provides a prime example. I' Although the change was
controversial, it took place through a long series ofjudicial decisions and
6. Id. at 505 (quoting PHILIP RIEFF, THE TRIUMPH OF THE THERAPEUTIC: USES OF FAITH
AFTER FREUD 2 (1968)).
7. Id.at511.

8. See generally id See also id. at 521, 523, 531 (discussing the role of the channelling
function inreform and stating
that channelling institutions
"make iteasier for people topredict the
consequences of their
acts").
9. See id. at 511.
10. Id. at515; cf Neil S.Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959,
960, 981 (2008) (arguing that judicial statesmanship "charges judges with approaching cases so as
to facilitate the capacity of the legal system to legitimate itself-over the long run and with respect
to the nation as a whole-by accomplishing two paradoxically related preconditions and purposes of
law: expressing social values as social circumstances change and sustaining social solidarity amidst
reasonable, irreconcilable disagreement"),
11. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND
REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 84, 87-88 (1991) [hereinafter FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF
EQUALITY]; MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 83 (1995) [hereinafter FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED
MOTHER]. Much earlier, of course, Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Komhauser also observed that

any change to gender neutral custody rules would weaken women's bargaining power at divorce.
See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 978 (1979).
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legislative innovations that adjusted custody law to reflect the changing
roles of men and women in childrearing. 12 These changes occurred
throughout the country-sometimes through legislation though often
without. 13 And although the decisions sometimes reflected regional
differences, they effected a transformation that produced shared national
understandings. 14 In contrast, I will argue that the new round of changes
has been more destructive of the channelling function not because it has
transformed families, institutions, or cultural meanings, but because it
does so in multi-directional ways for different people in different places
at different times.15
Second, I will argue that one of the most critical changes affecting
the family and challenging the role of the courts is the emergence of
marriage as a marker of class. Again, the mere fact that family change
plays out along class lines does not itself undermine the channelling
function. The seminal work on class and family law is Jacobus
tenBroek's description from the sixties of a dual system of family law. 16
In an era in which marriage determined family regularity, the law
recognized two family types: a privileged marital family of husband and
wife and the children born into the union, and a much smaller group of
single parent families produced by death, divorce or "illegitimate"
births. 17 tenBroek observed that the law for the former arose
overwhelmingly from private actions arising at divorce, while the law
for the latter reflected to a much greater degree state-initiated actions to
12.

For a description of these changes, see JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS:

THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW 180-94 (2000) [hereinafter FROM PARTNERS TO
PARENTS].
13. Id.at 191-92.
14. Seeid.at189, 191.
15. Indeed, as Justice Sandra Day O'Connor observed: "The demographic changes of the past
century make it difficult to speak of an average American family. The composition of families
varies greatly from household to household." Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000).
Nonetheless, as I will argue, it is not merely the fact of family change but the fact that these changes
have different meanings that most affects the channelling function. For example, both a middle class
and a working class mother may choose to have a child outside of marriage. The middle class
mother is more likely to do so with using sperm from an anonymous donor or friend who agrees to
sever his parental rights. The working class mother is more likely to do so because she became
accidentally pregnant, wants the child, and does not want to marry the father. Both the significance
of these decisions and the likely impact of the law on the involvement of the biological father in the
child's life are quite different in both their symbolic and practical efforts. For an exploration of the
different contexts, see generally ROSANNA HERTZ, SINGLE BY CHANCE, MOTHERS BY CHOICE:

HOW WOMEN ARE CHOOSING PARENTHOOD WITHOUT MARRIAGE AND CREATING THE NEW
AMERICAN FAMILY 57-103 (2006) (comparing donor dads with unmarried romantic partners).
16. See generally Jacobus tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin,
Development, and Present Status (pts. I, II, & II), 16 STAN. L. REV. 257 (1964), 16 STAN. L. REV.
900 (1964), 17 STAN. L. REV. 614 (1965) [hereinafter California'sDual System of Family Law].
17. Id. (pt. II) at 907.
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protect the public fisc.18 The very existence of two systems served to
channel the respectable into the first and to stigmatize the second with
society imposing the norms of the first system on those in the secondreaffirming their validity.' 9 The changes currently affecting the family
are different, at least in part, because they do not involve a privileged
group and a stigmatized group capable of marginalization. Instead, they
involve a broader set of changes along a class continuum that includes a
privileged middle class that continues to embrace somewhat traditional
marital norms, an increasingly separate working class cycling in and out
of marriage, and an underclass for whom marriage has effectively
disappeared. 20 The class changes in turn interact with racial, ethical,
regional, and especially gender differences to defeat shared meanings
but about the pressure
not only about institutions such as marriage,
2'
behavior.
predictable
produce
that
points
Finally, I will argue that different patterns of change for different
groups at different times and places are insufficient in itself to derail the
channelling function without the complicity of the courts themselves.
Driving that complicity is the courts' difficulty in dealing with the issue
of female choice. The channelling function exists on a continuum
bracketed by Justice Antonin Scalia's insistence on freezing
constitutional meaning in terms of the circumstances (and patriarchy) of
1787, on the one hand, and Justice William Brennan's equation of
liberty with state neutrality toward family form (and women's choices),
18. Id. (pt. I) at 257-58. These divisions between the family law of rich and poor, private and
public, voluntary and involuntary family associations have been the subject of extensive
commentary. See, e.g., Tonya L. Brito, The Welfarization of Family Law, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 229,
238-50 (2000); Naomi R. Cahn, Children's Interests in a Familial Context: Poverty, Foster Care,

and Adoption, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1189, 1211-15 (1999); Deborah Harris, ChildSupport for Welfare
Families: Family Policy Trapped in its Own Rhetoric, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 619,

621-29 (1988) [hereinafter Child Supportfor Welfare Families]; Leslie Joan Harris, The Basisfor
Legal Parentageand the Clash Between Custody and Child Support, 42 IND. L. REV. 611, 612-14

(2009) [hereinafter The Basis for Legal Parentage]; Jill Elaine Hasday, ParenthoodDivided: A
Legal History of the BifurcatedLaw of ParentalRelations, 90 GEO. L.J. 299, 368-71 (2002); Daniel
L. Hatcher, Child Support Harming Children: Subordinating the Best Interests of Children to the
Fiscal Interests of the State, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1029, 1043-44 (2007); Amy E. Hirsch,
Income Deeming in the AFDC Program: Using Dual Track Family Law to Make Poor Women

Poorer, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 713, 715-16 (1988).
19. See Schneider, supra note 1, at 506. Schneider acknowledged that one of the "troubling"
aspects of the channelling function was "its technique of promoting one institution by
disadvantaging the alternatives" and in some cases those who suffer most from the channelling
function are blameless, such as illegitimate children. Id. at 519-20. He nonetheless argued that the
channelling function was less coercive than many of the alternatives and that any costs had to be
weighed against the benefits to children who, for example, might be born into marital rather than
unmarital families because of the success of the channelling function. See id. at 520.
20. For a description of the changes, see infra Part II.
21. See infra Part V.A.
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on the other.22 In between, the courts might articulate new
understandings; ruling, for example, either that a biological father's
parental rights depend on the strength of his relationship with the child,23
or that a woman who invites a man to parent her children cannot later
deny his parental standing.24 Yet, to deal with these issues directly
means getting past monolithic views of marriage and gender. While
some courts in some states on some issues have been willing to address
these issues, many do not; they either withdraw from the channelling
function altogether, eschewing the articulation of their decisions in
normative terms,25 or issue conflicting or incoherent decisions that have
minimal impact on norms or behavior.26 What has sped their departure is
ideological division-many judges either value ideological purity more
than the forging of consensus-based norms, or seek to avoid
controversial decisions altogether for fear of partisan attack.2 7
22. Compare Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 126, 127-28 n.6 (1989), with id. at 141
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
23. For a man to develop a relationship with a child ordinarily requires the mother's consent.
See E. Gary Spitko, The ConstitutionalFunction of Biological Paternity:Evidence of the Biological
Mother's Consent to the BiologicalFather's Co-Parentingof Her Child, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 97, 104
(2006). For an argument that such consent should be constitutionally mandated, see generally id
24. For an example of the use of estoppel principles in parental standing cases, see UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT § 608 cmt. (2002).
25. See Katharine K. Baker, Homogenous Rules for Heterogeneous Families: The
Standardizationof Family Law When There Is No StandardFamily 4 (Mar. 9, 2011) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=1782051 ("Because
reformers cannot agree on principles that will lead to fair outcomes in the majority of cases, they
have settled for rules that can lead to consistent and efficient outcomes in the majority of cases.").
26. See, e.g., June Carbone, The Legal Definition of Parenthood: Uncertainty at the Core of
Family Identity, 65 LA. L. REV. 1295, 1295 (2005) [hereinafter The Legal Definition of Parenthood]
("The definition of parentage-and with it the determination of which adults receive legal
recognition in children's lives-has become the most contentious issue in family law. Not only are
jurisdictions irreconcilably divided in their approach to parentage, decisions under settled law in a
given county may not necessarily come out the same way.").
27. See Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, Gay Rights in the States: Public Opinion and
Policy Responsiveness, 103 AMER. POL. Sci. REV. 367, 370 & n.3, 382 (2009), available at
http://www.columbia.edu/-jrl2124/Lax Phillips GayPolicyResponsiveness 2009.pdf
(suggesting that some actors in a representative democracy, such as unelected courts, may have
different incentives than representing the majority opinion). Although same-sex marriage is the
issue most often described in these terms, it is a particularly complex one. Polls show public support
steadily increasing for same-sex marriage and legal changes largely in sync with the public shift.
See id. at 48 fig.6. Moreover, courts have in fact led in the creation of new norms about the
acceptability of gay and lesbian relationships and parenting and continue to do so. See, e.g., Carlos
A. Ball, The Backlash Thesis and Same-Sex Marriage: Lessonsfrom Brown v. Board of Education
and Its Aftermath, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1493, 1494 (2006) (concluding that "despite the
harmful backlash experienced by the gay rights movement following marriage cases such as
Goodridge [v. Department of Public Health], lesbians and gay men are nonetheless better off as a
result of those cases"); Jonathan Rauch, Red Families, Blue Families, Gay Families, and the Search
for a New Normal, 28 LAW & INEQ. 333, 343 (2010) (arguing that same-sex marriage contributes to
renormalizing family values). At the same time, however, many describe the issue in terms of an all-
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Ideological warfare, when combined with the already fractured meaning
of class-based family change, makes agreement on the institutions to be
championed and the shared meanings to be promoted a perilous
enterprise.28
In arguing that the channelling function in family law may be on
life support, I plan to return to the site of Schneider's original articlethe U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Michael H. v. Gerald D.29 and the
continued validity of the marital presumption. While Schneider cited the
case as an example of judicial recognition of the importance of
marriage,30 there are many additional ways to read the case with the
hindsight of almost twenty years of subsequent developments.
First, the effect of the decision has not been an unequivocal
embrace of the importance of marriage, the institution Schneider
defended in the original article. Instead, the result was to return the
matter to the states where two-thirds now allow the type of challenge
Michael H. rejected. 31 These state decisions have been characterized
more by incoherence than shared meaning-they rarely serve to channel
family life into marriage in the manner Schneider advocated nor do they
provide the basis for the emergence of an alternative national norm.32
Second, among the reasons for incoherence has been disagreement
on the significance of the marital presumption as a family norm. The

or-nothing clash of values. For example, Justice Scalia's dissent in Lawrence observes:
It is clear from this that the Court has taken sides in the culture war, departing from its
role of assuring, as neutral observer, that the democratic rules of engagement are
observed. Many Americans do not want persons who openly engage in homosexual
conduct as partners in their business, as scoutmasters for their children, as teachers in
their children's schools, or as boarders in their home. They view this as protecting
themselves and their families from a lifestyle that they believe to be immoral and
destructive.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
28. The federal system, of course, allocates primary responsibility for family law to the states
precisely because this type of division has been present since the country's founding. For a more
detailed discussion of this point, see NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE
FAMILIES: LEGAL POLARIZATION AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE 139-51 (2010) [hereinafter RED

FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES]. The authors argue for decentralization as a way to deal with political
polarization and differences in family values. Id. at 208.
29. 491 U.S. 110(1989).
30. Schneider, supra note 1, at 526 (stating that Michael H. advanced the channelling interest
by (1) preserving the stability of the marriage between Gerald and Carole, and (2) securing the
parenthood relationship between Victoria and her presumed parents).
31. Approximately two-thirds of the states similarly allow the non-marital father to challenge
the marital presumption through either statute or case law. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 607 cmt.
(2002).
32. See Theresa Glennon, Somebody's Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital
Presumptionof Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REv. 547, 573-77 (2000) (analyzing the issue of marital
presumption and the state courts' methods of resolving patemity disputes using genetic testing).
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Texas Supreme Court, in rejecting the continued application of the
presumption, observed that its principal effect is to allow the mother to
decide which man she wants to be the father of her child and the Court
had no interest in encouraging that development.33 While the Court
replaced its initial opinion with one eliminating any reference to gender,
the two decisions underscore the lack of agreement on the reciprocities
that today underlie decisions to marry and parent.34
Third, the Michael H. decision itself demonstrates the U.S.
Supreme Court's own fracture on the appropriate foundation of
constitutional decision-making. Justice Scalia's plurality opinion
devoted at least as much energy to his articulation of original intent as it
did to principles of family regularity. 35 Doing so magnified the disunity
of the Court making it impossible to secure a majority decision and
giving the dissent further reason to disavow the result. Ideological
division has only increased in the decades since,36 undermining
commitment to the very channelling function Schneider championedone that links the integrity of institutions to shared understandings rather
than to partisan advantage.37
This Article concludes that revisiting Michael H. and the
channelling function in light of the developments of the intervening
years produces an overwhelming sense of irony: the channelling
function might have been better served had the dissent prevailed.
Michael H. was the last in a series of cases that attempted to modernize
the legal definition of parenthood and articulate the obligations mothers
and fathers have to each other.38 With the Court's fracture in Michael H.,
the Supreme Court has not taken another such case since and we are
39
arguably worse for it.
This Article will first discuss the erosion of the channelling interest
in family law in the context of increasing class division. Second, it will
33. See, e.g., In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189, 197-98 (Tex. 1994). See also infra text
accompanying notes 185-87.
34. In re J.W.T., No. D-1742, 1993 Tex. LEXIS 101, at *31-32 (Tex. June 30, 1993),
withdrawn, In re J.WT., 872 S.W.2d at 197-98 (treating the biological father as the father and
objecting to the dissent's treatment of him as "a stranger to the marriage," and insisting that the
father is a stranger "only in so far as the statutory law has traditionally deprived him of his rights").
35. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123-24 (1989).
36.

RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES, supranote 28, at 61, 66, 71.

37. See Schneider, supra note 1, at 511.
38. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 126; see also infra text accompanying notes 161-70.
39. The only parental rights' case since 1989 has been Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57
(2000). The Court upheld the right of a fit parent to limit visitation of his or her children in the face
of grandparents' requests for greater visitation. Id. at 63. Troxel did not involve, however, the
definition of marriage or parenthood, and the Court split in at least as many ways as it did in
Michael H., bringing no greater coherence to family law decision-making. Id. at 59.
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examine the changing role of class and gender in determining the
effectiveness of channelling strategies. Third, it will revisit the Supreme
Court's decision in Michael H. and the subsequent state cases on the
marital presumption and argue that the case undermined, rather than
enhanced, the prospects for shared national meaning about family
institutions. Finally, it will acknowledge that the channelling interest
survives in some states for some matters in ways that may lay the
foundation for its eventual resurrection.
II.

MISSING IN ACTION? FAMILY LAW IN AN AGE OF DIVISION

Family law has been on the frontline of domestic battles for the last
fifty years, with the courts performing the often subtle updating that has
kept judicial decisions in the forefront of articulating norms and
reconciling evolving practices with older institutions. The judicial
system has overseen divorce reform, which finally overcame decades of
religious opposition to sweep the country during the sixties and
seventies.40 Custody law became "ground zero" in the gender wars as the
courts remade custody presumptions to reflect new, more egalitarian
attitudes toward parenting. 41 And same-sex marriage and abortion have
been central to what Justice Scalia termed a "Kulturkampf, 'A 2 as
attitudes toward social issues have become more polarized over the last
thirty years.
Yet, the new issue remaking American families has not yet
captured the imagination of courts or legislatures, though it lurks
beneath the subjects that have. That issue involves the emergence of
marriage as a marker of class-separating not just the poor from the
middle class, but emerging on a continuum that makes college graduates
distinct from the working class, who in turn retain different practices

40.

See Doris Jonas Freed, Groundsfor Divorce in the American Jurisdictions(as of June 1,

1974), 8 FAM. L.Q. 401,421-23 (1974) (listing grounds for divorce in each state and indicating that
by 1974 only Illinois, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota required "fault
grounds"). See also J. HERBIE DIFONZO, BENEATH THE FAULT LINE: THE POPULAR AND LEGAL
CULTURE OF DIVORCE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 145, 167-70 (1997) (describing the

evolution of no-fault divorce in California through judicial decisions and legislative action).
41. FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS, supranote 12, at 180, 191.
42. Marc R. Poirier, Same-Sex Marriage, Identity Processes, and the Kulturkampf. Why
Federalism Is Not the Main Event, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 387, 387-88 & n.3 (2008)
(defining "Kulturkampf" as a culture war in which "two strongly and bitterly opposed views of
culture have sought to win over whatever jurisdictions they can, establishing beachheads"). For
Justice Scalia's references to "Kulturkampf' and culture wars, see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,
636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). "It is clear... that the Court has taken sides in the culture war .. " Lawrence, 539
U.S. at 602.
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from the poor.43 Sociologists began to chart the divergence in the family
practices between college graduates and the rest of the population
roughly a decade ago. 44 Since 2010, the Marriage Project and the Pew
Research Center released major studies that set forth the details in
unmistakable terms.45 While a generation ago, the marital practices of
college graduate men differed little from those of their high school
peers-and college graduate women were less likely to marry than those
with less education-today the class patterns diverge sharply. 46 The
likelihood of marrying, staying married, and raising children within a
stable two-parent family correlates strongly with class.47 Family scholars
celebrated the leveling off of divorce rates in the nineties, 48 but only
recently noticed that the composite figures masked a sharp class
divergence. For female college graduates, divorce rates have indeed
improved and are back to the level of the sixties-before adoption of nofault divorce. 49 For everyone else, divorce rates continued to rise.50 Nonmarital birth rates present an even more dramatic picture. For the
country as a whole, non-marital births have approached and then
exceeded those of African-Americans that had prompted the Moynihan
43. June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, ChangingMarriagePatternsReflect Economics and Class,
NEW DEAL 2.0 (May 20, 2011, 11:01 AM), http://www.newdeal20.org/2011/05/20/changingmarriages-patterns-reflect-economics-and-class-45726/.
44. See Sara McLanahan, Diverging Destinies: How Children Are FaringUnder the Second
Demographic Transition,41 DEMOGRAPHY 607, 612 (2004).
45. See generally GRETCHEN LIVINGSTON & D'VERA COHN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE NEW
DEMOGRAPHY OF AMERICAN MOTHERHOOD (2010), available at http://pewsocialtrends.org/
files/2010/10/754-new-demography-of-motherhood.pdf (examining the changing demographic
characteristics of U.S. mothers); PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE AND RISE OF
NEW FAMILIES (2010), available at http://pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/11/pew-social-trends2010-families.pdf (examining the decline of marriage in the United States).
46. See RICHARD FRY, PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE REVERSAL OF THE COLLEGE MARRIAGE
GAP 7 (2010), available at http://pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/1 0/767-college-marriage-gap.pdf,
NAT'L MARRIAGE PROJECT, THE STATE OF OUR UNIONS 2010, WHEN MARRIAGE DISAPPEARS: THE
NEW MIDDLE AMERICA 21 fig.3 (W. Bradford Wilcox & Elizabeth Marquardt eds., 2010), available
WHEN
[hereinafter
at
http://www.virginia.edu/marriageproject/pdfs/Union_ 1_12_10.pdf
MARRIAGE DISAPPEARS] (during the seventies, highly educated and moderately educated
Americans were equally likely to be married; today the highly educated are more likely to be in
intact first marriages). See also KAY S. HYMOWITZ, MARRIAGE AND CASTE IN AMERICA: SEPARATE
AND UNEQUAL FAMILIES IN A POST-MARITAL AGE 19 (2006).
47. See HYMOWiTZ,supra note 46, at 19-23.
48. Chapter 4: Underlying Population Trends, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/reports/
FAMILIES,
FOR CHILDREN &
ADMIN.
projections/ch04.html (last visited Nov. 11,2011).
49. See generally Steven P. Martin, Growing Evidence for a "Divorce Divide"? Education
and Marital Dissolution Rates in the U.S. Since the 1970s (unpublished manuscript, Russell Sage
http://www.russellsage.org/sites/all/files/u4/MartinGrowing%20
available at
Foundation),
Evidence%20for%20a%2ODivorce%20Divide.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2011).
50. See id. at 20. See also RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES, supra note 28, at 40 fig.2.1;
WHEN MARRIAGE DISAPPEARS, supranote 46, at 19 fig. 1.
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Report's cries of alarm during the sixties 51 and now account for 41% of
the national total.5 2 Yet, for college graduates, non-marital birth rates,
which never exceeded 10%, declined in the nineties. 3 White college
graduates, in particular, have held the line on non-marital births and the
most recent figures put the number at 2% of births for that group--the
same percentage of a generation earlier.54
The class-based nature of these changes has generated remarkably
little commentary in family law. To be sure, political scientists have
pointed out that the culture wars over high profile issues such as samesex marriage reflect class-based anxieties over family change, but the
number of people directly affected by the ability of gays and lesbians to
marry pales in comparison with those affected by divorce and nonmarital births.5 5 And while the increases in divorce and non-marital
births have certainly drawn notice-and much hand-wringing by judges
and legislatures-the class-based nature of the changes has generated
much less attention. 6
To the extent that class has been an issue at all, it has been an issue
defined in the sixties by tenBroek's classic work on the dual nature of
family law. 7 tenBroek identified two different strands of family law:
one for the middle class, initiated by private parties and focused on the
governance of voluntary transactions, and a second for the poor, more
commonly initiated by the state to impose obligations designed to
protect the public fisc. 5 While tenBroek's commentary retains much of
51. In their introduction, Douglas S. Massey and Robert J. Sampson observe that
"Moynihan's core argument was really rather simple: whenever males in any population subgroup
lack widespread access to reliable jobs, decent earnings, and key forms of socially rewarded status,
single parenthood will increase, with negative side effects on women and children." Douglas S.
Massey & Robert J. Sampson, Moynihan Redux: Legacies and Lessons, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& SOC. SCI., Jan. 2009, at 6, 13. For a retrospective on the Moynihan Report, see Symposium, The
Moynihan Report Revisited: Lessons and Reflections After FourDecades, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& SOC. Sci., Jan. 2009.
52. LIVINGSTON & COHN, supranote 45, at 13.
53. McLanahan, supra note 44, at 612 fig.3. But see WHEN MARRIAGE DISAPPEARS, supra
note 46, at 23 fig.5 (showing a small increase between 1982 and 2006-2008).
54. WHEN MARRIAGE DISAPPEARS, supra note 46, at 23 fig.5, 56 fig.S2 (showing white nonmarital births for college graduates holding steady at 2%, but increasing to 6% for college graduates
as a whole).
55. See LIVINGSTON & COHN, supra note 45, at 13 (finding non-marital births are now 41%
of all American births); June Carbone, What Does Bristol Palin Have to Do with Same-Sex
Marriage, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 313,341 (2010).
56. See MeLanahan, supra note 44, at 607-08 (suggesting that the conventional wisdom has
been that changes to the family were "all of one piece" led by the most advantaged women).
57. See generally California'sDual System of Family Law (pts. I, 11,& III), supranote 16.
58. See id. (pt. 1) at 257-58. tenBroek maintained that the two strands were:
[D]ifferent in origin, different in history, different in substantive provisions, different in
administration, different in orientation and outlook. One is public, the other private. One
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its force in describing the continuing differences between the family law
of the college-educated middle class and that of the poor, 59 it misses the
emergence of a third strand of family law that applies to the increasingly
unstable families of the working class. 60 This group is less likely than the
poor to receive public benefits and less likely than the middle class to
plan their relationships in ways that make the law that governs
dissolution predictable. 6 1 Their interactions with the legal system in
actions involving divorce, custody, and support do not necessarily look
all that different from the divorce, custody, and support actions of other
62
groups. Instead, the factor that distinguishes the emerging law of the
working class is the underlying assumptions about gender-the courts
just do not know what to do with women who sleep with one man, marry
another, and raise their children with a third.63
The channelling function Schneider identified has often taken the
form of courts expressing disapproval of the underclass and imposing
punitive measures on welfare recipients and prison inmates who fail to
conform to middle class standards-stigmatization of those outside
mainstream norms has been critical to the effect.64 It is harder to insist
on a single channel when the group operating outside of approved
pathways becomes large enough to defy marginalization. Both
deals with expenditure and conservation of public funds and is heavily political and
measurably penal. The other deals with the distribution of family funds, focuses on the
rights and responsibilities of family members, and is civil, nonpolitical, and less penal.
One is for underprivileged and deprived families; the other for the more comfortable and
fortunate.
Id.
59. See supra note 18.
60. Hatcher, supra note 18, at 1043 ("However, given the historical development and
converging interests within the various forms of child support, the 'dual system' description is
somewhat oversimplified.").
61. The increase in state-initiated child support actions, which are primarily targeted at
securing support for children whose custodians receive state benefits, leveled off after 2000. The
only increase for women not on welfare after 1990 has come through more efficient paternity
establishment systems. See Elaine Sorensen & Ariel Hill, Single Mothers and Their Child-Support
Receipt: How Well Is Child-Support Enforcement Doing?, 39 J. HUM. RESOURCES 135, 136, 140,
152 (2004); The Basisfor Legal Parentage,supra note 18, at 619-20 (describing genetic testing as a
cheap "norm for resolving parentage disputes").
62. The markers of class occasionally show up in gendered terms, such as when the dissent
points out that the custodial mother may have had multiple partners, in part because without the
delinquent father's support payments, she had difficulty making ends meet. See, e.g., Alphin v.
Alphin, 219 S.W.3d 160, 167-68 (Ark. 2005) (Dickey, J., dissenting).
63. See, e.g., Librers v. Black, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 188, 190, 197 (Ct. App. 2005).
64.

See, e.g., MARY P. RYAN, CRADLE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS: THE FAMILY IN ONEIDA

CouNTY, NEW YORK, 1790-1865, at 184-85 (1981) (emphasizing the asserted moral superiority of
the Protestant middle classes over the Catholic working class because of their ability to keep their
children out of the factories); Hatcher, supra note 18, at 1065 (describing punitive child support
actions against those with child support debts).
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tenBroek's dual system and Schneider's channelling function involved
clear distinctions between the evolving middle class norms that govern
divorce cases and the punitive terms that emerged as conditions for
government support.65 These distinctions, however, have become harder
to maintain as women have become independent enough to be able to
make choices without government assistance and to do so outside of the
family structure that some of the men in their lives would like to impose
on them. Moreover, while the courts have proven eager to reward men
who step to the plate and volunteer to assume responsibility for
children,66 they have much more difficulty with cases where more than
one man has come forward and the mother has chosen one to the
exclusion of the other. 67 The courts have also become accustomed to
presiding over a family court system that requires formal action to
dissolve a relationship, establish paternity, or award support.68 The law
has greater difficulties managing a family system where increasing
numbers of families may resolve their relationships by never marrying,
applying for assistance, or coming to court-making the more visible
system of laws and mores increasingly at odds with the lived
experiences of much of the public.
In the social transformations of previous eras, the law, as Schneider
emphasized, may not necessarily have directly influenced the results, but
it often gave voice to emergent norms and reconciled new practices with
public sensibilities.69 In the current era, family law has become a
cacophony of voices-judges in different regions, counties, and
sometimes even courtrooms within the same building disagree on the
values family law should promote. 70 The disagreement starts with the
fact that American families are no longer changing in the same direction
in response to shared experiences.

65. See California'sDual System of Family Law (pt. I), supra note 16, at 257-58; Schneider,
supra note 1, at 519.
66. See Pearson v. Pearson, 182 P.3d 353, 357-58 (Utah 2008) (finding challenges to paternity
"disruptive and unnecessary" for non-biological father who volunteered to assume responsibility for
child).
67. Compare id. at 354, 357-58 (upholding marital presumption at divorce even though
mother and biological father were marrying and child was still under two), with Wiese v. Wiese,
699 P.2d 700, 701, 703 (Utah 1985) (treating husband as a stepparent and refusing to award child
support to the mother, even though husband knew from the beginning of the marriage that the child
was not his, secured custody of the child in the period immediately after the divorce, and did not
contest paternity until the mother sought support four years after the divorce decree had become
final).
68. See, e.g., California'sDual System of Family Law (pt. III), supra note 16, at 617, 620,
623.
69. See Schneider, supranote 1, at 497.
70. See, e.g., supranotes 25-26 and accompanying text.
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THE OLD FAMILY BARGAIN: "GOOD GIRLS DON'T," GIVES WAY
TO THE NEW, "GIRLS RULE"

The traditional family bargain rested on the presumed inequality of
the sexes and women's practical dependence on men. William Kristol,
for example, wrote that women, who were unlikely to come to these
conclusions on their own, must be taught "to grasp the following three
points: the necessity of marriage, the importance of good morals, and the
necessity of inequality within marriage.,

71

Adrienne Rich, though

certainly disagreeing with Kristol on the desirability of such an
72
approach, critiqued heterosexual unions in remarkably similar terms.
She saw marriage as the product of forces that pressured women into
marriage, however unsatisfying or oppressive women might find the
relationship.73 She explained that "[w]omen have married because it was
necessary, in order to survive economically, in order to have children
who would not suffer economic deprivation or social ostracism, in order
to remain respectable, in order to do what was expected of women. 74
In the family world that emerged from nineteenth century
industrialism, men controlled the access to market labor and a woman
who wanted children needed to marry and stay married to "survive
economically" and to escape the stigma from "immorality" or divorce
that would otherwise have ostracized her and her children.75 In such a
world, women were expected to say "no," and the middle and working
class women who could say "no," often had more power when they
did.76 An unmarried woman who became pregnant, however, might be
desperate-unless she arranged for a marriage, she and the child faced
disgrace, and in the fifties, as non-marital pregnancies increased, the
stigma associated with non-marital births prompted the huge increase in
adoptions and often dangerous back alley abortion. 77 For those able to
secure a marriage, whether before or after the pregnancy, the wife's

71.

William Kristol, Women 's Liberation: The Relevance of Tocqueville, in INTERPRETING

TOCQUEVILLE'S DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 480,491 (Ken Masugi ed., 1991).

72. Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, 5 SIGNS 631, 654
(1980).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 641-42, 654 (internal quotation marks omitted).
76. On the implicit bargains underlying sex, see LINDA R. HIRSHMAN & JANE E. LARSON,
HARD BARGAINS: THE POLITICS OF SEX 141-42 (1998) (arguing that an emphasis on sexual restraint
would enhance a woman's bargaining power).
77.

See, e.g., STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND

THE NOSTALGIA TRAP 202 (1992) (describing the increase in teen births in the fifties, but noting
that they remained overwhelmingly within marriage); RICKIE SOLINGER, WAKE UP LITTLE SUSIE:
SINGLE PREGNANCY AND RACE BEFORE ROE V. WADE 21, 149 (1992).
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power reached its nadir the greater the number of young children she
had.7s Accordingly, so long as the man in her life earned enough to
support her, she was better off married and practically stuck, whether or
not she was happy.79
Over the last half-century, women's position vis-A-vis men's has
changed dramatically. Every group of women except for high school
dropouts has seen their income improve, while every group of men
except for college graduates has seen their prospects decline. 80 The
gendered "wage gap," which stayed stable for decades, has narrowed for
the population as a whole,8 1 but has done so overwhelmingly because of
the degree to which poor men have lost ground-college graduate
women have lost ground to the men as the income of the top earners has
increased disproportionately:

1990
2008

Female Median Income as a Percentage
of Male Median
82
Education
by
Income
High
Some
Bachelor
No High
School
School
College
Degree
69%
70%
71%
70%
71%
66%
76%
73%

While women as a whole still earn less than men, the "wage gap" has
shrunk the most for the least educated, and a higher percentage of
women now earn more than their male partners.83
The changes in income parallel changes in employment stability.
The National Marriage Project reports that during the seventies the
likelihood that a man would be unemployed varied little by class, with
almost identical rates for the highly educated and moderately educated,
and slightly higher rates for the poorly educated.84 The rates for the
highly educated are the same today, but employment instability for other
men has increased substantially:

78. See SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 157-59 (1989) (noting a
loss of power and fewer opportunities for women to earn a living as they have more children).
79. See Rich, supra note 72, at 654.
80. RICHARD FRY & D'VERA COHN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., WOMEN, MEN AND THE NEW
ECONOMICS OF MARRIAGE 8 (2010), available at http://pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/1 /neweconomics-of-marriage.pdf.

81.

Id.at 9.

82.

Median Annual Income, by Level of Education, 1990-2008, INFOPLEASE

(2007),

http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0883617.htmllixzzl JFxpOxL9 (last visited Nov. 11, 2011).
83.

FRY & COHN, supra note 80, at 2 (reporting that the percentage of wives who earn more

than their husbands increased from 4% in 1970 to 22% in 2007).
84.

WHEN MARRIAGE DISAPPEARS, supranote 46, at 43 fig. 17.
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at
Percentage of Twenty-Five to Sixty Year-Old Men Unemployed
85
Some Point Over the Preceding Ten Years
Highly
Moderately
Least Educated
Educated
Educated
29%
30%
33%
1970s
29%
39%
44%
2000s
These factors make working class men less attractive partners.
Women who can earn as much or more than the fathers of their children
are much less dependent, and women married to abusive or unreliable
mates have less reason to stay in a relationship than the women of earlier
eras. 86 The male breadwinner role, in turn, continues to define male
success, and the loss of both status and income that comes with less
stable employment causes many men who cannot meet the expectations
associated with the breadwinner role "to be deemed as failures by
society, themselves, and their partners. ' 87 Newsweek reported in 2009
that the American Time Use Survey shows that "laid-off men tend to do
less-not more-housework, eating up their extra hours snacking,
sleeping and channel surfing (which might be why the Cartoon Network,
whose audience has grown by 10 percent during the downturn, is now
running more ads for refrigerator repair school). 88 According to the
same study, unemployed women spend twice as much time taking care
of children and doing chores as the men.89 Moreover, unemployed men
are right behind alcoholics and drug addicts as the group most likely to
beat their female partners. 90
Sociologist Paul Amato puts this picture together in a different way.
When he looked at data from 1980, he found that those experiencing
85. Id. Male employment stability, measured by changes in jobs, has steadily declined for
most of the period since World War II while female employment stability has increased through
much of that period. See Henry S. Farber, Is the Company Man an Anachronism? Trends in LongTerm Employment in the United States, 1973-2006, in THE PRICE OF INDEPENDENCE: THE
ECONOMICS OF EARLY ADULTHOOD 56, 62-63, 63 fig.3.2 (Sheldon Danziger & Cecilia Elena Rouse

eds., 2007).
86.

See, e.g., Sara McLanahan & Christine Percheski, Family Structure and the Reproduction

oflnequalities, 34 ANN. REV. SOC. 257, 261 (2008) ("Wage inequality may also make men in the
bottom half of the income distribution less attractive as marriage partners.").
87. Id.
88.

Tony Dokoupil, Men Will Be Men: When Guys Lose Jobs, the TV, Den and Gym Win.

Women? Sex? Not So Much, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 2, 2009, at 50, 50.
89. Id.
90. Id. For a more comprehensive review of these changes, see June Carbone, Unpacking
Inequality and Class: Family, Gender and the Reconstruction of Class Barriers,45 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 527,556-58 (2011) [hereinafter Unpacking Inequality and Class].
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financial distress were more divorce prone than those who did not
experience financial distress. 91 No surprise there. By 2000, however, the
effect had been magnified-those experiencing financial distress were at
twice the risk for divorce than those who were financially stressed in
1980, and those who were not financially stressed became even less
likely to divorce.92
Amato explains that one of the factors that exacerbated the
relationship between financial distress and divorce was women's
employment. 93 Among the least happy couples he found were those
where the wife preferred to work outside the home part-time or not at all,
but needed to work full-time because her husband could not support the
family without her income.94 Amato concludes:
[D]ual-earner arrangements are linked with positive marital quality
among middle-class couples and with negative marital quality among
working-class couples. Although the additional income provided by
working-class wives helps.., their families, these financial benefits
come with a steep price in the form of greater marital tension, low job
satisfaction, and a desire to95 ... decrease their hours of employment or
return to... homemaking.
In comparison with better educated women, less educated women were
both more likely to prefer a traditional division of family responsibilities
and less likely to be married to men who could earn enough to make it
possible for them to cut back on outside employment.9 6
These changes affect not only divorce rates, but the exercise of
power within intact marriages. The Pew Research Center study of the
effect of increases in women's earnings shows that where a husband
earns more than a wife, the couple is about equally as likely to say that
the husband (35%) or the wife (36%) makes the financial decisions for
91. PAUL R. AMATO ET AL., ALONE TOGETHER: How MARRIAGE IN AMERICA IS CHANGING
132 fig.4.8 (2007).
92. Id. Amato et al. also indicated that almost all of those marrying in their twenties reported
financial distress, even though overall fewer couples were in financial distress during the relatively
prosperous period at the end of the nineties than in 1980. Id. at 135. One notable change from 1980
to 2000 is that college educated women began to many and have children at substantially later ages,

while the age of family formation increased substantially less for others. See McLanahan, supra
note 44, at 610 fig.1.
93. AMATO ET AL., supranote 91, at 137-38 (distinguishing between college graduate women
in the professional and managerial ranks and less educated women).

94. Id. at 138 (concluding that the labor force participation of working class wives, without
college degrees, adds to marital stress).
95. Id. at 139.
96. Id. at 138. Amato et al. also found that holding conservative views about gender roles was

associated generally with "less marital happiness, less marital interaction, and more conflict." Id. at
167.
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the household.97 When the wife earns more on the other hand, 46% say
the wife makes the decisions, in comparison with 21% indicating that the
husband makes decisions.98 Both results suggest that a change in the
relative financial position of husband and wife has an impact on family
relationships, and particularly an effect on the power dynamic within the
marriage. 99
The change in bargaining power fundamentally remakes intimate
bargains. Women are no longer dependent on men. They may choose to
marry or have a child without marrying.' 0 0 They may decide whether to
stay or leave an unhappy relationship.' 01 They may accordingly expect
more from marriage102 and become more hesitant to enter into a
relationship when they doubt they can realize the benefits that make
marriage worthwhile. 0 3 These changes affect all women, but they
disproportionately affect the marriage choices of working class and poor
women because these women find it more difficult to find a man who
constitutes a "good deal."'' 4 Sara McLanahan and Christine Percheski,
for example, explain that if we assume that the standard of living a
couple is expected to obtain before they marry "is a function of the

97. FRY & COHN, supra note 80, at 18.
98. Id.
99. Unpacking Inequalities and Class, supra note 90, at 560. The question of whether
women's economic independence relates to greater divorce rates is a complex one. See generally
Jay Teachman, Wives' Economic Resources and Risk of Divorce, 31 J. FAM. ISSUES 1305 (2010)
(concluding that wives' economic resources are linked to divorce rates for whites, but not Blacks).
But see Liana C. Sayer & Suzanne M. Bianchi, Women's Economic Independence and the
Probabilityof Divorce, 21 J. FAM. ISSUES 906, 914, 918 (2000) (concluding that a wife's economic
circumstances have a weak effect on divorce rates and that marital quality is a better predictor).
100. For a discussion of the change in marital bargaining undermining the shot gun marriage,
see generally George A. Akerlof et al., An Analysis of Out-of-Wedlock Childbearingin the United
States, 111 Q.J. ECON. 277 (1996).
101. For a discussion of bargaining over custody and support, see generally Paula England and
Nancy Folbre, Involving Dads: Parental Bargaining and Family Well-Being, in HANDBOOK OF
FATHER INVOLVEMENT: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 387 (Catherine S. Tamis-LeMonda &

Natasha Cabrera eds., 2002).
102. McLanahan and Percheski refer to these greater expectations as a "marriage bar, defined
as the standard of living a couple is expected to obtain before they marry." McLanahan &
Percheski, supra note 86, at 261.
103. For a discussion of the role of uncertainty on the attitudes of African-American women,
see generally Linda M. Burton & M. Belinda Tucker, Romantic Unions in an Era of Uncertainty:A
Post-MoynihanPerspective on African American Women and Marriage, 621 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 132 (2009). Burton and Tucker observe, for example, that African-American
women identified the following risks from romantic involvement: "financial (many had finally
obtained some degree of financial stability and were concerned that monetary entanglements with
another would deplete their resources), physical (older men were more likely to become infirm,
require care, and become dependent), and psychological (they preferred a life of independence,
finally free from the demands of others-something they had been denied)." Id. at 135-36.
104. Id. at 135.
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median income of married couples, the distance becomes even greater as
marriage becomes increasingly concentrated among high-income
couples. Thus, the decline in marriage among low-income populations
05
likely has a negative feedback effect by raising the bar even further."'
The National Marriage Project finds that the working class, which
used to marry more than other groups, has been particularly affectedexpressing greater skepticism about the likelihood of making marriage
work and reporting fewer successful marriage models in the community
around them. 106 The college-educated middle class, in contrast,
expresses a more favorable attitude toward marriage than it did a
generation ago and reports greater marital quality and greater male
participation in childrearing.10 7 A new set of family law norms, indeed, a
more finely attuned set of channelling practices, cannot occur therefore
in the absence of sensitivity to the effect of class.
IV.

GENDER, CUSTODY, AND SUPPORT

The effects of class on family law require reconsideration of the
issue of gender. To the extent that women's bargaining power has
increased, most observers predict less marriage.'0 8 Less marriage,
however, affects children's welfare and raises the question of who will
decide what becomes of the children. 0 9 Resolving disputes about
parenthood, custody, and support in an era of less stable family
105. McLanahan & Percheski, supra note 86, at 261.
106. WHEN MARRIAGE DISAPPEARS, supra note 46, at 39-41. The survey reflected that the
percentage of participants agreeing that "marriage has not worked out for most people they know"
varies from 53% of the least educated to 43% of the moderately educated to 17% of the most
educated. Id. at 40.
107. AMATO ET AL., supra note 91, at 137-38; WHEN MARRIAGE DISAPPEARS, supra note 46,
at 27-33 (showing that attitudes toward sex, fidelity, and divorce have become more "conservative"
among the highly educated and more "liberal" among the less and moderately educated);
McLanahan, supra note 44, at 613 fig.5 (finding that married middle class men's domestic
contributions have increased more than those of other groups).
108. Gould and Paserman, for example, found:
[M]arriage rates decline with higher education, higher wages for women, and demand
shifts in favor of women; marriage rates increase with age, higher wages for men and a
higher ratio of men to women. Overall, the results show that women get married less
when their labor market prospects improve (relative to men), and they get married more
when marriage market conditions improve and when labor market prospects for men are
relatively better.
Eric D. Gould & M. Daniele Paserman, Waiting for Mr. Right: Rising Inequality and Declining
Marriage Rates, 53 J. URBAN ECON. 257, 269 (2003). See also David S. Loughran, The Effect of
Male Wage Inequality on Female Age at First Marriage,84 REV. ECON. & STAT. 237, 249 (2002)
(concluding that "increasing male wage inequality lowered the propensity to marry").
109. For a discussion of the effect of changing family patterns on children, see Ron Haskins,
Moynihan Was Right: Now Wat?, 621 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 281, 284-86 (2009)
(summarizing the negative effects of family instability on children).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol39/iss4/4

18

Carbone: Out of the Channel and into the Swamp: How Family Law Fails in a

20111

OUT OF THE CHANNEL AND INTO THE SWAMP

relationships is a major undertaking. Marriage, after all, resolved the
issue by channelling parents into marriage and keeping them there; an
era of marital instability requires redirecting the relationship between
men, women, and children.
While the changing relationship between class and family structure
has generated relatively little discussion of family law bargaining,
gender relationships have prompted considerably more. Almost a decade
ago, I described custody battles as "ground zero in the gender wars."' 10
Martha Fineman has devoted more than one volume to the change in the
law that has weakened women's bargaining position at divorce,
particularly through the change from a maternal presumption to more
facially neutral rules."' Margaret Brinig showed in an empirical study
that women are more likely to file for divorce than men and their ability
so. 112
to secure custody of the children affects their willingness to do
With child support replacing spousal support as the most common
financial obligation surviving divorce, perhaps the largest impact 1on
3
bargaining power has been the increasing support for shared custody."
The idea of shared custody involves a move away from an award of
physical or legal custody to a single parent and toward the goal of
14
encouraging "frequent and continuing contact with both parents.""1
With most states factoring time spent with children into child support
awards, one of the most effective ways of reducing child support has
become seeking additional time with the children." 5 These changes in
110. FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS, supra note 12, at180.
11l.FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY, supra note 11, at ch. 5; FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED
MOTHER, supranote 11, at 82-83. Much earlier, of course, Mnookin and Komhauser also observed
that any change to gender neutral custody rules would weaken women's bargaining power at
divorce. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 11, at 978.
112. Margaret F. Brinig & Douglas W. Allen, "These Boots Are Made for Walking": Why
Most Divorce FilersAre Women, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 126, 128 tbl. 1,136-37 (2000) (stating that
two-thirds of those filing for divorce are women and custody laws affect willingness to file).
113. See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig, Does Parental Autonomy Require Equal Custody at
Divorce?, 65 LA. L. REV. 1345, 1367-68 (2005) (finding a decrease in child support after statutory
changes in custody provisions took effect); Margaret F. Brinig, Penalty Defaults in Family Law:
The Case of Child Custody, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 779, 806 (2006) [hereinafter Brinig, Penalty
Defaults] (noting that there was an increase in joint custody where couples separated after the
statute took effect).
114.

PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS

§ 2.08 cmt. a (2000) (noting that while almost all states seek to encourage the involvement of both
parents, few mandate "joint custody" or an equal sharing of the child's time (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
115.

See ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND

LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 117 (1992) (indicating that joint physical custody awards resulted
in less child support, but finding no evidence that child support was affected by negotiated
settlements where mother received sole physical custody); MARY ANN MASON, THE CUSTODY
WARS: WHY CHILDREN ARE LOSING THE LEGAL BATTLE, AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT 22-23

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2011

19

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 4

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:859

the law of custody and support introduce new incentives into divorce
bargains-a powerful incentive to learn the truth about paternity. As
long as an intimate relationship that may produce more children lasts,
neither the man nor the woman in a relationship may wish to inquire too
closely into paternity of existing children. 1 6 When that relationship
ends, the easiest way for the man to end the possibility of support may
be to determine that he has no biological relationship to the child, and
the easiest way for the mother to oppose his requests for custody and
visitation may be to introduce DNA samples that show that he is not the
father.1"
Moreover, the class-based nature of intimate bargains may further
skew the results. All men today spend on average more time on
childcare than they did fifty years ago. 1 18 The increases have been
greater, however, for married men than unmarried men and for better
educated than less educated men.1 19 Middle class women are more likely
to defer childbearing until marriage, less likely to have an unintended
pregnancy, and more likely to either encourage the father's participation
or arrange or provide for the termination of his parental status. 120 As a
result, a married middle class father is more likely to have spent time
with his children during a relationship and to want to continue to do so
after the split. 21 For the working class, both the relationships between
the parents, and between father and child, may be more fragile. 22 The
(1999) (discussing that judges' willingness to award joint custody has changed the nature of divorce
bargaining); Brinig, Penalty Defaults, supra note 113, at 799, 811-12 (observing that after Oregon
changed its custody statute to favor more time with both parents, the decline in value of child
support awards provided evidence of 'bargaining around' the support guidelines).
116. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind? Redefining the Parent-Child
Relationship in an Age of Genetic Certainty, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1011, 1066 (2003)
[hereinafter Which Ties Bind?].
117. The Supreme Court's decision in Troxel v. Granville complicates things further as it
grants those defined as "parents" greater rights, making it more difficult for the states to choose to
recognize "stepparents." 530 U.S. 57, 72-73 (2000). Compare Emily Buss, "'Parental"Rights, 88
VA. L. REv. 635, 657-58 (2002) (arguing that Troxel depends on the legal definition of parenthood
provided by the states and imposes no constitutional limits on how the states choose to define
parenthood), with David D. Meyer, ConstitutionalPragmatismfor a Changing American Family,
32 RUTGERS L.J. 711, 714, 718 (2001) (asserting that the Troxel plurality's approach amounted "to
an implicit rejection of strict scrutiny," but read in light of other Supreme Court decisions on
parental rights, does not give the states unlimited discretion in defining parents).
118. McLanahan, supra note 44, at 613 fig.5.
119. Id.
120. HERTZ, supra note 15, at 84 (noting that middle class heterosexual women are more likely
to "protect the boundaries" between social and genetic kinship); McLanahan & Percheski, supra
note 86, at 262 ("[M]ore advantaged women delay both marriage and children.").
121. McLanahan, supra note 44, at 612, 613 fig.5.
122. See id. at 612-14 (showing that fathers' involvement correlates with marital status and
class).
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state has insisted on pursuing child support for mothers who receive
state aid, but it is less likely to do so for others. 123 Given fathers' greater
ability to seek custody or visitation and their economic incentive to do
so, more 1 mothers
in the middle class may forego child support
24
altogether.
How have the courts responded to these patterns? While class
remains largely invisible in judicial decisions, attitudes toward gender
periodically surface. The far more pervasive issue, however, involves the
question of meaning. Can the courts channel family behavior in an era of
division? The answer is that they have very little idea how to do so and
the marital presumption that Schneider defended has changed from a
symbol of the effectiveness of the channelling function to a symbol of its
decay.
V.

THE MARITAL PRESUMPTION AND THE INTERSECTION OF CLASS
AND GENDER

A.

The Meaning of the MaritalPresumption

In the era in which marriage determined legal parenthood, the law
connected fathers to children largely through marriage. 125 Outside of
marriage, the law generally recognized a single legal parent, even if the
second biological parent was alive, well, and participated in the life of
the family. 126 In this setting, a responsible man who wished to accept
parental responsibilities married the mother of his children. If he failed
to do so, he might not be recognized as a legal parent at all, and if he
obtained a court order127establishing paternity, he was unlikely to receive
custody or visitation.
123. See Leslie Joan Harris, Questioning Child Support Enforcement Policyfor Poor Families,
45 FAM. L.Q. 157, 161 (2001); Single Mothers Since 2000 Falling Farther Down,
LEGAL

MOMENTUM,

http://www.legalmomentum.org/our-work/women-and-poverty/resources--

publications/ single-mothers-since-2000.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2011) ("Despite rising joblessness
and poverty, the percentage of single mother families receiving welfare benefits fell from 16% in
2001 to 11% in 2007, and to 10% in 2010.").
124. See HERTZ, supra note 15, at 103 (stating that economically self-sufficient women view
the amount of child support likely to be ordered as too small to be worth pursuing in comparison
with the risks involved).
125. For a description of the law that applied to unmarried fathers, see HARRY D. KRAUSE,
ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 28-36 (1971) (explaining that unmarried fathers had
limited status as parents with respect to their children).
126. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650 & n.4 (1972). Indeed, in the seminal Stanley case,
the unmarried mother and father lived in the same household on and off for eighteen years. Id.at
646.
127. In addition, he was often not liable for support. The West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals observed that "[t]he harsh reality was that illegitimate children often had to rely on the
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With the disappearance of marriage as the dividing line between
trustworthy and irresponsible men, the law has struggled to determine
which men to recognize.128 The key to understanding the struggle is to
recognize that the reciprocities underlying the marital presumption no
longer exist.12 9 In the older era, the stigmatization a woman faced if she
gave birth outside of marriage meant that the pregnancy would make it
more difficult for her to marry another man; a responsible man could be
expected to propose to his pregnant partner, and she would have little
choice but to accept if he did. 3 0 Moreover, if a man married a woman to
"give the child a name," the law often used estoppel principles to
prevent him from later denying paternity. 3 1 More importantly, marriage,
whatever the motives that prompted it, could be expected to
last,
32
protecting the child's interest in legitimacy and financial support. 1
Today, women have access to reliable contraception and
abortion, 133 and the better educated the woman, the less likely she is to
have an unplanned birth. 134 Moreover, with less stigma associated with
non-marital sexuality, women are freer to choose to raise the child on
their own, reconcile with husbands who know that the woman is about to
give birth to another man's child, or marry or cohabitate with someone
else. 35 Indeed, traditional nuclear families, defined as heterosexual
married couples living with their own children, make up less than a

government to care for their needs because there were no remedies at common law to compel a
putative biological father to care for any illegitimate children he may have sired." State ex rel. Roy
Allen S. v. Stone, 474 S.E.2d 554, 564 (W.Va. 1996) (citations omitted).
128. See, e.g., Glennon, supra note 32, at 568 (observing that the states vary widely in their
interpretation of the statutes adopting the marital presumption and appear to do so in accordance
with different notions of fatherhood).
129. Compare id. at 562-63, with David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition:
Tensions Between Legal, Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood,54 AM. J. COMP. L.
125, 132-33 (2006) [hereinafter Parenthoodin a Time of Transition].
130. See Akerlof et al., supra note 100, at 279. For a discussion of the change in implicit
bargains, see id. at 290-97.
131. See, e.g., W. v. W., 728 A.2d 1076, 1079, 1086 (Conn. 1999); Pietros v. Pietros, 638 A.2d
545, 545, 548 (R.I. 1994). Indeed, even today a man who knows he is not the father and assumes a
paternal role may be estopped from denying paternity in some jurisdictions. See, e.g., Lee v. Lee, 12
So.3d 548, 551 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009); Godin v. Godin, 725 A.2d 904, 910 (Vt. 1998);
Marriage/Children of Betty L.W. v. William E.W., 569 S.E.2d 77, 86 (W. Va. 2002).
132. See McLanahan, supranote 44, at 613 fig.4 (showing dramatic increases in divorce after
the mid-sixties).
133. Akerlof et al., supranote 100, at 307.
134. Rachel Benson Gold, Rekindling Efforts to Prevent Unplanned Pregnancy: A Matter of
'Equity and Common Sense,' GuTrMACHER POL'Y REV., Summer 2006, at 2, 7, available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/09/3/gprO90302.pdf.
135. See, e.g., HERTZ, supra note 15, at 102-03 (observing the effect of the decline of the
stigma against single parenthood in creating more varied family structures).
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quarter of all households in the United States today.136 In these
circumstances, the law might reasonably choose to advance three
competing objectives:
*
*

*

continue to promote marriage, with the recognition that
marriage is less secure than in earlier eras;
affirm the right of the biological father to establish patemity
and a relationship with the child, with the expectation that
biology is permanent even if marriage is not; or
choose the father to recognize based on the circumstances of
individual cases, in accordance with137the best interest of the
child and the behavior of the parents.

Choosing among these competing approaches-privileging
marriage, biological paternity, or functional parenthood-requires not
just an initial choice but working through the norms that channel
behavior into each alternative institution and managing the consequences
of doing so. Since Schneider wrote his article two decades ago, the
courts have split in addressing these potential objectives and they have
done so without any overarching agreement about the possible
purposes-or consequences-of their choices. 138 At least part of the
reason is that they have been unable to grapple consistently with the
notion of female choice. 139 After all, the principal impact of the marital
presumption today is that it allows the mother to determine which man
to recognize as the legal father; the principal impact of a biology-based
determination is that it gives the biological father significant rights in the
child whether or not he has established a relationship with the mother or
a willingness to contribute to the child's well-being.140 Yet, the decisions

136. JASON FIELDS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P20-553, AMERICA'S FAMILIES AND LIVING
ARRANGEMENTS: 2003, at 2 (2004), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p20553.pdf (noting that the percentage of traditional nuclear families was down from 40% in 1970 to
23% in 2003); Parenthoodin a Time of Transition, supranote 129, at 132.
137. See Parenthoodin a Time of Transition,supra note 129, at 132, 138-40.
138. See generally The Legal Definition of Parenthood,supra note 26.
139. Seeid. at 1323.
140. See Mary L. Shanley, Unwed Fathers' Rights, Adoption, and Sex Equality: GenderNeutrality and the Perpetuationof Patriarchy,95 COLUM. L. REV. 60, 74 (1995) (discussing the
parental rights of the biological father); The Legal Definition of Parenthood,supranote 26, at 1341
(stating the presumption that the mother's husband is the legal father). Decisions to recognize
functional relationships also vary in their willingness to articulate norms capable of shaping
behavior. Compare Hardy v. Hardy, No. 10-698, 2011 WL 661692, at *3, *8 (Ark. Feb. 24, 2011)
(denying paternity testing on a best interest basis where the boy was eight at the time of the divorce
and the husband was the only child the father had known), with Wiese v. Wiese, 699 P.2d 700, 703
(Utah 1985) (treating the husband as a stepfather rather than maintaining the fiction of biological
parentage). See also Hammack v. Hammack, 737 N.Y.S.2d 702, 703-04 (App. Div. 2002) (applying
the best interest test in accordance with the child's needs).
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are rarely articulated in such terms. 141 The success of the channelling
function in earlier eras depended on the reciprocities implicit in social
norms, for example, if a man got a woman pregnant, he was expected to
marry her and she was expected to say yes. 42 The failure to make the
changed understandings underlying these institutions explicit
undermines the shared
meaning Schneider described as the core of the
143
channelling function.

In this context, it is hard to say whether the continued affirmation
of the marital presumption in fact contributes to shared understandings
of marriage. 44 Instead, the lack of recognition of the changing terms of
men and women's relationships guarantees the marginalization of the
leading opinions, starting with the opinion Schneider championed-the
Supreme Court's decision to uphold the45constitutionality of the marital
presumption in MichaelH. v. GeraldD.1
B.

Michael H. Revisited

Schneider referred to Michael H. as an example of a decision
upholding the importance of marriage. 146 To the extent, however, that
channelling as a judicial function involves modernizing and reinforcing
shared norms, 147 Michael H. may have sounded its death knell,
undermining-rather than enhancing-the role of the courts in
burnishing shared understandings at the national level. It did so for at
least three reasons. First, the effect of the decision was to return the
matter to the states. 148 Second, Justice Scalia's defense of marriage in
141. Indeed, when the Texas Supreme Court did acknowledge the gendered nature of the
decision, the Court replaced its opinion with one withdrawing the reference. In re J.W.T., No. D1742, 1993 Tex. LEXIS 101, at *31-32 (Tex. June 30, 1993), withdrawn, In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d

189, 197-98 (Tex. 1994).
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

See, e.g., Akerlofet al., supra note 100, at 279.
See Schneider, supra note 1, at 511.
See Shanley, supranote 140, at 74 (discussing the marital presumption).
491 U.S. 110 (1989).
Schneider, supra note 1, at 526 (describing Michael H. as serving two "institutional"

interests: an interest in the stability of marriage and in interest in the stability of Victoria's
relationship with her presumed parents (internal quotation marks omitted)).
147. Schneider's emphasis, like mine, is on the creation of sharedmeanings associated with an
institution. See id. at 505, 511 (referring to "reasons which sink so deep into the self that they

become common and implicitly understood" (internal quotation marks omitted)). He also refers,
however, to the notion that institutions change and develop over time, and distinguishes between the
continued evolution of the norms associated with marriage versus deinstitutionalization of intimate
behavior or legal neutrality between different forms of family organization. Id. at 519.
148. The decision, after all, upheld the constitutionality of the marital presumption-it did not
require the states to apply it. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 129-30. Today, approximately two-thirds of
the states allow the non-marital father to challenge the marital presumption through either statute or

case law. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 607 cmt. (2002).
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accordance with a constitutional methodology of original intent
eschewed the modernizing function that might have linked the continued
vitality of marriage to emerging, rather than outdated, norms. 14 9 Third,
Justice Scalia's denigration of Michael's relationship with Carole and
Victoria, rather than lock in consensus norms, fractured the Court,
leaving dissenters-and the portion of the public who agree with themfree to reject the validity of the Court's approach. 150 Each of these points
requires consideration in light of changing family norms.
To be sure, Justice Scalia's plurality opinion and Justice Brennan's
dissent captured the opposite sides of the issue Schneider posed. Justice
Scalia's plurality opinion referred to parents' constitutional rights as
rooted in "the historic respect-indeed, sanctity would not be too strong
a term-traditionally accorded to the relationships that develop within
the unitary family,"' 5' and he privileged the marital family over other
"unitary families" that might receive constitutional protection. 152 The
opinion thus involved the unequivocal embrace of the importance of
marriage as an institution.153
In addition, as Schneider noted, the case presented a particularly
strong factual context for the reaffirmation of marriage. By the time the
Supreme Court decided the issue, five years had passed, and the mother,
Carole, had cut off the biological father Michael's contact with the child,
and Carole and her husband Gerald had managed to stay married, move
154
from California to New York, and have two additional children.
Whatever the relationship Michael had with the child Victoria during her
toddlerhood, she was unlikely to remember him five years later, and
recognizing Michael's paternity would have in fact constituted a
potentially disruptive interference in an ongoing family.
Moreover, as Schneider also emphasized, Justice Brennan's dissent
did not so much offer an alternative "channel" for family
understandings, as it emphasized the need to recognize a variety of
family forms, and to protect the underlying functional relationships that
had been established in the case.1 55 The opinion therefore did not try to

149.
150.
marriage,
151.

See infra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
For a more extensive discussion of the subsequent polarization over the meaning of
see RED FAMILIES v. BLUE FAMILIES, supranote 28, at 155-61, 164-65.
MichaelH., 491 U.S.at 123.

152. Id. at 123-24. Justice Scalia describes the rights of the biological father versus the
husband as a choice between ruling that "Michael. .. [is] unable to act as father of the child he has
adulterously begotten, or Gerald. . . [is] unable to preserve the integrity of the traditional family
unit he and Victoria have established." Id.at 130.
153. Id. at 124, 131.
154. See Which Ties Bind?, supra note 116, at 1045.
155. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 145 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan referenced
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modernize marriage or parenthood; instead, it insisted
on a definition of
' 156
"liberty" that included "the freedom not to conform."
Schneider's channelling function article thus corresponded to the
split between the plurality and the Brennan dissent when it cast the
choice between an effort to channel family behavior into marriage versus
a determined neutrality that took no position on the acceptability of the
behavior. 157 Yet, the analysis did not discuss a third possibility, which
Schneider had linked to the channelling function, namely, the updating
of the meaning of marriage to reforge the connections between the
institution and changing behavior. It did not do so in part because it
never acknowledged the issue offemale choice and the limitations on it.
Michael H. represented the final case in the line of Supreme Court
decisions forcing the states to modernize the legal recognition of
paternity. The cases began with Stanley v. Illinois.5 ' Until Stanley, the
privileging of marriage had been so absolute that the state of Illinois
treated Stanley's biological children as parentless rather than recognize
an unmarried man as a father, despite the fact that the mother had died
and Stanley had lived with the mother and children on and off for
eighteen years. 159 The subsequent cases-Quilloin v. Walcott,"60 Caban
v. Mohammed,16 1 and Lehr v. Robertson162-involved

disputes between

mothers and unmarried fathers-disputes often prompted by the
mother's decision to break up with the father or to marry someone
else. 163 The Court's evolving paternity jurisprudence was moving toward
Justice Scalia's "pinched conception of 'the family."' Id. Justice Brennan regarded the "rhapsody on
the 'unitary family' as "out of tune" with prior decisions. Id.He concluded:
We are not an assimilative, homogenous society, but a facilitative, pluralistic one, in
which we must be willing to abide someone else's unfamiliar or even repellent practice
because the same tolerant impulse protects our own idiosyncracies [sic]. Even if we can
agree, therefore, that "family" and "parenthood" are part of the good life, it is absurd to
assume that we can agree on the content of those terms and destructive to pretend that
we do. In a community such as ours, "liberty" must include the freedom not to conform.
The plurality today squashes this freedom by requiring specific approval from history
before protecting anything in the name of liberty.
Id. at 141.
156. Id.(internal quotation marks omitted).
157. See Schneider, supra note 1, at 531 (arguing that the state cannot avoid the choice of
encouraging existing institutions or embracing other ones, such as turning family law into contract
law).
158. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
159. Id. at 646-47, 651 (recognizing deference to an unmarried father's private interest "in the
children he has sired and raised").
160. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
161. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
162. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
163. For a discussion of these cases, see FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS, supra note 12, at 166-
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a conclusion that biological fathers who stepped forward to accept
responsibility for the child merited protection, but it had not resolved the
issue of whether the mother had an obligation to allow the biological
father--or any other man-the opportunity to do so.' 64 The earlier cases
had held, however, that once the biological father did establish a
recognition
relationship with the child, the mother could no longer block
65
of the father's paternity merely by marrying someone else. 1
Michael H. raised the issue of whether these changing norms
applied to women who conceived a child with another man during
marriage and allowed the biological father to establish a relationship
with her and the child.166 The case offered a variety of intermediate
positions that could have affirmed the importance of marriage, while still
recognizing the impact of women's greater independence in family
decision-making. 16 No justice, after all, thought that the biological
father had a constitutional right to recognition on the basis of biology
alone. 168 And eight of the justices recognized the importance of
protecting extant family relationships; they just differed on the issue of
whether Michael, Carole, and Victoria had ever established enough of a
"unitary family"' 169 to bar the states from recognizing Gerald, Carole,
164. Id at 169; Janet L. Dolgin, Just A Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood,40
UCLA L. REV. 637, 671 (1993) ("A biological father does protect his paternity by developing a
social relationship with his child, but this step demands the creation of a family, a step itself
depending upon an appropriate relationship between the man and his child's mother.").
165. See, e.g., Caban, 441 U.S. at 389 (finding unconstitutional the statute that allowed the
stepfather to adopt the unmarried father's children where the biological father had established a
relationship with the children).
166. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 113-14 (1989). The dissent contended that "[t]he
evidence is undisputed that Michael, Victoria, and Carole did live together as a family; that is, they
shared the same household, Victoria called Michael 'Daddy,' Michael contributed to Victoria's
support, and he is eager to continue his relationship with her." Id.at 143-44 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
167. See id. at 124-25, 129 (majority opinion); id. at 136 (Stevens, J., concurring).
168. Justice Byron White made the strongest case for the identification of fatherhood with
biology, but still limited constitutional recognition to men who stepped forward to seize the parental
role. See id. at 157-60 (White, J., dissenting).
169. See id at 142 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (framing the issue of the case as whether Michael
and Victoria had a protected family unit relationship). Indeed, even Justice Scalia did not limit
constitutional recognition to the marital family. He observed in a footnote:
The family unit accorded traditional respect in our society, which we have referred to as
the "unitary family," is typified, of course, by the marital family, but also includes the
household of unmarried parents and their children. Perhaps the concept can be expanded
even beyond this, but it will bear no resemblance to traditionally respected
relationships-and will thus cease to have any constitutional significance-if it is
stretched so far as to include the relationship established between a married woman, her
lover, and their child, during a 3-month sojourn in St. Thomas, or during a subsequent 8month period when, if he happened to be in Los Angeles, he stayed with her and the
child.
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and Victoria's family instead. 170 Had the Court focused on that question,
that is, whether Michael had ever established enough of a functional
family with Carole and Victoria to pass constitutional muster, it might
have established guidelines for subsequent decisions. 7 ' The guidelines
could have reaffirmed the importance of marriage, upheld the
constitutionality of the California law, and reconciled the marital
presumption with emerging understandings about acceptable choices
with respect to paternity. The actual decision not only did not do so; it
resolved the case in ways that removed the Court from the channelling
process altogether.
First, the core of Justice Scalia's plurality opinion upheld the
constitutionality of the marital family on the basis of the historic respect
accorded marriage, and remanded the case to the states with no
suggestion that the Constitution imposed any limits on the states' refusal
to recognize the biological father. 7 2 The Supreme Court has thus been
out of the business of reviewing state paternity determinations since
1989 and, as the next section of this Article will demonstrate, the states
replicate the divisions that fractured the Supreme Court. The result
undermines even the pretense of shared meanings about marriage, at
least at the national level.
Second, Justice Scalia's invocation of original intent as
constitutional methodology is inconsistent with critical parts of the
channelling function Schneider identified, such as the expression of
shared norms, the articulation of public purposes, or the reconciliation of

Id. at 123 n.3 (majority opinion).
170. Compareid at 124, with id at 157 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia explained:
Justice Brennan insists that in determining whether a liberty interest exists we must look
at Michael's relationship with Victoria in isolation, without reference to the
circumstance that Victoria's mother was married to someone else when the child was
conceived, and that that woman and her husband wish to raise the child as their own. We
cannot imagine what compels this strange procedure of looking at the act which is
assertedly the subject of a liberty interest in isolation from its effect upon other peoplerather like inquiring whether there is a liberty interest in firing a gun where the case at
hand happens to involve its discharge into another person's body. The logic of Justice
Brennan's position leads to the conclusion that if Michael had begotten Victoria by rape,
that fact would in no way affect his possession of a liberty interest in his relationship
with her.
Id. at 124 n.4 (majority opinion) (footnote omitted). The analysis is particularly pointed in this case
as a factual matter because by the time the case reached the Supreme Court, five years had passed,
Gerald and Carole remained together, moved from California to New York, and had two additional
children within the marriage. See Which Ties Bind?, supranote 116, at 1045.
171. Justice Scalia, for example, noted that one of the purposes of the marital presumption was
to preclude "inquiries into the child's paternity that would be destructive of family integrity and
privacy." Michael H., 491 U.S. at 120.
172. Id. at 123-24, 129-30.
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new practices with older institutions. 173 Michael H. occurred relatively
early in Justice Scalia's time on the bench and he used it as a vehicle for
articulation of the principles associated with original intent as much, if
not more, than as a resolution of family law principles. 74 His
methodological approach commanded only one other vote-that of
Chief Justice William Rehnquist. 175 Yet, it staked out a position that has
meant, as a practical matter, those who agreed with him would oppose
updating the meaning of marriage or other family practices beyond those
in existence in 1787.
Third, Justice Scalia's uncompromising defense of marriage as it
existed in the eighteenth century fractured the Court and hindered, rather
than facilitated, the expression of shared understandings. Indeed, the
opinion did not even clearly define the nature of the differences among
the justices. 176 Molly Shanley observed, for example, that, although

Justices Scalia and White reached opposite conclusions about the statute
at issue, both of their opinions "adopted male-centered models of the
basis of parental rights."' 177 In contrast, she identified both Justice
Brennan's dissent and Justice John Stevens's concurrence in the result
with greater deference to the mother's role in the child's life. 78 As a
173. See Schneider, supra note 1, at 506, 511, 519. Schneider observed that "social institutions
link us both to the past and the future." Id.at 511.
174. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 141 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy refused to join in Justice Scalia's articulation of the principles underlying original intent.
See id. at 128 n.6 (majority opinion) (arguing for "the most specific level at which a relevant
tradition... can be identified" and describing that tradition in Michael H. as "the rights of the
natural father of a child adulterously conceived"). Justices O'Connor and Kennedy concurred in all
but footnote six of Justice Scalia's plurality opinion, and Justice O'Connor's one paragraph
concurrence objected that Justice Scalia's approach was inconsistent with prior precedent and that
she "would not foreclose the unanticipated by the prior imposition of a single mode of historical
analysis." Id at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
175. Id.at 113 (majority opinion) (noting the justices' opinions, with only Chief Justice
Rehnquist joining Justice Scalia's judgment in full).
176. Lynne Henderson critiques Justice Scalia's opinion in terms of its emphasis on obeying
the rules, punishment, and coercion. In accordance with this analysis, Justice Scalia ties his analysis
of original intent to Michael's status as the father of an "adulterously conceived child," thus
justifying his conclusion that Michael's relationship with Victoria did not merit constitutional
protection. See Lynne Henderson, Authoritarianismand the Rule of Law, 66 IND. L.J. 379, 380,
444-45 & n.436 (1991) (identifying authoritarianism with inflexibility, coercion, and punishment
and critiquing Michael H. because Justice Scalia's opinion suggested a bias "against violation of
conventional norms").
177. Shanley, supra note 140, at 74. Justice White's dissent gave more weight than any of the
other opinions to the role of biology, and he emphasized the importance of the biological tie even
more in his dissent in Lehr v. Robertson. 463 U.S. 248, 272 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) ("The
'biological connection' is itselfa relationship that creates a protected interest.").
178. Shanley, supra note 140, at 74 (observing that Justice Stevens's opinion acknowledged
the "inherent biological and sociological differences between care of the fetus by a woman and a
man" and Justice Brennan's opinion tied recognition of a father's rights to establishment of a

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2011

29

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 4

HOFSTRA LA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 39:859

practical matter, the plurality opinion simultaneously disapproved of
Carole's sexual behavior and upheld her decision-making authority. It
did little to facilitate shared expectations about marriage, parenthood, or
the role of law in resolving future disputes. In the meantime, the matter
has become the province of the states.
C.

The MaritalPresumptionRevisited: The States, Class, and Gender

The fractured decision in Michael H. returned the issue to the states
with little guidance, and the states replicated the divisions on the
Supreme Court. Few states adopted Justice Scalia's preference for
original intent as judicial methodology, but many preferred bright line
rules to case-by-case decision-making, 7 9 and those preferring bright line
rules split between marriage and biology. 80 They have rarely, however,
made explicit the normative foundation for their rulings.
Of those preferring biology to marriage, perhaps the most intriguing
explanation comes from Texas. The Texas Supreme Court issued an
opinion striking down the marital presumption as a violation of the state
constitution, then withdrew the opinion and substituted another.'8 1 The
original opinion observed that perhaps the marital presumption made
sense in an era in which biological parenthood could not be determined
with certainty, but that today the focus should be on the child's interests:
[I]t may be in [the] best interest of the child to allow development
of a relationship with the natural father and it may not. The effect
of the alternative offered by the dissenting justices is to leave this
determination of the child's best interest and the definition of
family, itself, exclusively to the biological mother. In the name of
protecting the family, the [dissent] would grant rights to putative
fathers who had been permitted by the mother to develop a
the child but not to those not afforded that
relationship 18with
2
opportunity.

relationship with the child that necessarily required the mother's cooperation).
179. See, e.g., Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 190 (Iowa 1999) ("The traditional ways to
establish legal parentage have dramatically changed in recent generations, as has the traditional
makeup of the family."); State ex reL. Roy Allen S. v. Stone, 474 S.E.2d 554, 562-63 (W. Va. 1996)
("Such a reading runs contrary to the holdings of many cases, fails to accord proper respect to
diversity and individualism, and pretty much protects only those liberties that rarely need judicial

protection." (footnote omitted)).
180. Compare J.N.R. v. O'Reilly, 264 S.W.3d 587, 596 (Ky. 2008) (Cunningham, J.,
concurring), with In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189, 194 (Tex. 1994).
181. In re J.WT, No. D-1742, 1993 Tex. LEXIS 101, at *31-32 (Tex. June 30, 1993),
withdrawn, In re J. W.T., 872 S.W.2d at 197-98.
182. In reJ.W.T., 872 S.W.2d at 197 (footnote omitted).
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The substituted majority opinion dropped the explicit reference to
the mother's decision-making power. Instead, it treated the biological
father as the father and objected to the dissent's treatment of him as a
"stranger to the marriage," insisting that the father is a stranger "only in
so far as the statutory law has traditionally deprived him of rights. 183
Whether or not the Texas decision recognized it explicitly or not,
the practical effect of granting rights on the basis of biology has been to
allow the biological father to establish a relationship with the child over
the objection of the mother and her husband. Thus, the Iowa Supreme
Court acknowledged that in finding that the biological father had "a
liberty interest in challenging paternity," it also implied that he "may
84
have a fundamental right to maintain a relationship" with the child.1
David Meyer concludes that "[t]he readiness of these jurisdictions to
reassign parental status on receipt of a DNA match, even when that
means extinguishing a substantial pre-existing parent-child bond, reveals
a reflexive commitment to biology as the essential foundation of
parenthood." 185 More practically, it also protects a man's right of access
to a child, suggesting that once a woman sleeps with a man she (and her
husband) must allow him to develop a relationship with a resulting
child. 86 If the biological father has the wherewithal to insist on a
paternity test (or to secure one on his own), he merits constitutional
protection in Iowa, Texas, and a number of other states. Even without a
constitutional mandate, the majority of states now allow the biological
father some ability to establish parenthood even over the objection of the
mother and her husband. 87 In Missouri, for example, the courts have
held that once a man is recognized as a biological father, he is entitled to

183. Id. at 198.
184. Callender, 591 N.W.2d at 190 n.5. See also Courtney v. Roggy, 302 S.W.3d 141, 151
(Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (stating that the biological father is entitled to establish a relationship with the
child unless "visitation would endanger the child's physical health or impair his or her emotional
development" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
185. Parenthoodin a Time of Transition,supra note 129, at 138-39.
186. See Schneider, supra note 1, at 526-27 (justifying the marital presumption in part because
of the potential disruption of the marital family).
187. See, e.g., Courtney, 302 S.W.3d at 149 ("[A] man alleging himself to be afather... may
bring an action at any time for the purpose of declaring the existence or nonexistence of the father
and child relationship." (emphasis added) (quoting Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.826 (West 2010)); Fisher
v. Tucker, 697 S.E.2d 548, 550 (S.C. 2010) (holding that South Carolina's statutory presumption of
paternity within marriage can be rebutted by blood tests); Watermeier v. Moss, No. W2009-00789COA-R3-JV, 2009 WL 3486426, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2009) (holding that a Tennessee
statute required that for the marital presumption to preclude paternity for the biological father, the
married couple needed to have lived together at the time of conception, remained together through
the filing of the petition, and the husband and mother needed to sign an affidavit attesting to
biological paternity).
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visitation unless "visitation would endanger1' 88
the child's physical health
or impair his or her emotional development."
A minority of states, however, continue to uphold the marital
189
presumption as close to absolute, at least during an existing marriage.
Yet, they do not agree on what values the marital presumption is
designed to promote. One opinion observed, for example, that the
determination of paternity "is squarely about the legal status of marriage
in the Commonwealth of Kentucky today.... The severely wounded
institution of marriage in Kentucky surely protects the parties from
unwanted interlopers claiming parenthood of a child conceived and born
during their coverture."' 190
The Kentucky case nonetheless produced five opinions and the
court quickly distanced itself from the case in subsequent cases,191
finding it to be of little precedential value and finally overruling it three
years later.192 In between, the Kentucky Supreme Court struggled with a
case where the parties divorced, remarried, and divorced again,' 93 and an
intermediate appellate court allowed the presumption to be rebutted
where the wife tried to use her continuing marriage to a husband who
had suffered brain damage
in the military to block recognition of the
194
child's biological father.

188. Courtney, 302 S.W.3dat 151.
189. Approximately two-thirds of the states similarly allow the non-marital father to challenge
the marital presumption through either statute or case law. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 607 cmt.
(2002).
190. J.N.R. v. O'Reilly, 264 S.W.3d 587, 596-97 (Ky. 2008) (Cunningham, J., concurring).
191. Id. at 588, 595-96. See, e.g., lA.S. v. Bushelman, 342 S.W.3d 850, 853 (Ky. 2011)
(explicitly overruling J.N.R.); Bailey v. Bertram, No. 2009-SC-000210-MR, 2010 WL 1641115, at
*4 (Ky. Apr. 22, 2010) (distinguishing .JN.R.);Tommy L. v. Bramlage, No. 2010-SC-000336-MR,
slip op. at 5 (Ky. Apr. 21, 2011), available at http://opinions.kycourts.net/sc/2010-SC-000336MR.pdf (distinguishing J.N.R.).
192. JA.S., 342 S.W.3d at 853.
193. The case involved a husband and wife who acknowledged, in their first divorce petition,
that they had separated in July 2003, and that the wife had become pregnant in October 2003 with a
non-marital partner. Six months after the divorce was granted, but a day before the baby was bom,
the parties remarried-only to divorce again three years later. The divorce decree awarded joint
custody. After the second divorce, the wife told the non-marital father that he was the biological
father; he then filed for paternity but both of the former spouses tried to prevent the case from going
forward. Smith v. Garber, No. 2009-SC-000738-MR, 2010 WL 6815999, at *1 (Ky. June 22, 2010).
194. See Draper v. Heacock, No. 2010-CA-000112-ME, slip op. at 2, 13 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 21,
2011), available at http://opinions.kycourts.net/coa/201O-CA-0001 12.pdf. The appellate court held
that the marital presumption could be rebutted because of "the limited precedential value of JN.R.
and the distinguishable facts and circumstances," including the husband's severe physical and
mental disabilities from boxing injuries. Id. at 2, 8. The court also held that the wife had waived any
ability to question the standing of the biological father, who had been adjudicated the father. Id. at
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The facts of these cases are simply too varied (and in some cases
bizarre) to be resolved under the rubric of promoting marriage, but the
insistence on treating marriage as a monolithic institution stands in the
way of evolving norms and sometimes cloaks unresolved differences
about marital roles. A Kentucky judge, for example, commented in a law
review article critiquing these cases that the rulings are unlikely to
contribute to family stability: "It can be argued, however, that allowing
the mother the discretion to influence the court's determination of
paternity does not preserve the nuclear family, but rather undermines the
institution of marriage by sweeping under the195rug fidelity issues that
often result in more damage to the family unit."'
It may be a better critique to say that the pretense that the issue is
about the importance of marriage makes it difficult to separate cases
where the husband has assumed the parental role from those where the
biological father is the only father the child is likely to know.' 96 Both
some of the cases that uphold the marital presumption, 97 and some that
reject it,' 98 seem to be motivated more by a desire to punish the mother
than by concern for the institution or the needs of the child.' 99
States that approach the determination of paternity on a case-bycase basis come closer to articulating principles that might influence
standards of behavior, but they do not necessarily do so consistently or
in a way that would command support in Kentucky or Texas. California,
for example, recognizes a presumption of paternity that arises not only
from marriage, but from the act of welcoming a child into one's

195. See Judge Christopher J. Mehling & Matthew W. Swafford, A Biological Father'sRights
Extinguished, 37 N. KY. L. REv. 343, 349-50, 359 (2010).
196. Compare Draper, at 2, 3 & n.1 (stating that the biological father was the father in the
house around the child while the husband suffered brain damage that eventually lead to his
institutionalization), with J.N.R., 264 S.W.3d at 588 (upholding the marital presumption where the
mother and husband reconciled).
197. See, e.g., Pearson v. Pearson, 182 P.3d 353, 354, 359 (Utah 2008) (continuing to
recognize the husband-who was the husband at the time of the child's birth-as the father at
divorce even though by the time the case was decided the biological father and the mother had
married).
198. See, e.g., Wiese v. Wiese, 699 P.2d 700, 701-03 (Utah 1985) (treating the husband who
was excluded by paternity tests as a biological parent as a "stepparent" not liable for child support).
199. See Pearson, 182 P.3d at 358-59 (denying the biological father's motion to establish
paternity for the child even though the mother was married to him at the time of the decision
because her ex-husband had already assumed the role of father for the child); Wiese, 699 P.2d at
702-03 (releasing the non-biological father from the obligation of having to pay child support after
his divorce from the mother). The Kentucky opinion allowing rebuttal of the marital presumption
also seemed eager to ensure that the biological father, rather than the husband, bore financial
responsibility for the child. See J.A.S. v. Bushelman, 342 S.W.3d 850, 856-57 (Ky. 2011)
(discussing the importance of allowing the mother to seek child support from the biological father in
the event of divorce and the husband to challenge paternity if he chose).
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household and holding out the child as one's own.2 °° Proof that the child
is not the biological offspring of the putative parent does not necessarily
rebut the presumption; instead, if there is more than one presumed
parent, the courts choose between them on the basis of all the
circumstances. 20 '
The doctrine reflects a determination that each child should have
two legal parents and that function is more important than biology.2 2
Gabriel P. v. Suedi D.203 illustrates an application of the doctrine. The
mother, Suedi, was fifteen when she became pregnant.2° She had
engaged in sexual relations with two men-twenty year-old Gabriel and
twenty-nine year-old Anthony.2 5 When Gabriel declined to marry her,
Suedi told him that he was not the father. 0 6 A year later, Suedi and
Anthony married and had a child together. 20 7 Gabriel, however, insisted
on his own paternity tests, and after they showed that he was the
biological father, he sued to establish paternity.20 8 The trial court ruled in
his favor, and set aside Anthony's declaration of paternity, but the court
of appeals reversed, finding instead that both men were presumed fathers
and that the trial court should choose between them in light of all the
circumstances.2 9
200. See June Carbone, From Partnersto Parents Revisited: How Will Ideas of Partnership
Influence the Emerging Definition of California Parenthood?, 7 WHITrIER J. CHILD. & FAM.
ADVOC. 3, 5 (2007) [hereinafter From Partnersto Parents Revisited]. For an in depth discussion of
the California cases, see generally id.
201. See, e.g., In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2, 13, 15 (Cal. 2004) (determining that conflicting
presumptions of paternity are to be resolved according to weightier policy considerations).
202. FromPartnersto ParentsRevisited, supra note 200, at 8.
203. 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 437 (Ct. App. 2006).
204. Id. at438-39.
205. Id. at 439.
206. Id. In fact, no paternity tests occurred until Anthony insisted-when the baby was ten
months old-and the test indicated that Anthony was not the father. Id.
207. Id. at 440.
208. Id. at 439-40.
209. Id. at 440, 447. The court cited Section 7611 of the California Family Code as possible
grounds to recognize Anthony as a presumed father. Id. at 446. Section 7611 provides:
(c) After the child's birth, he and the child's natural mother have married, or attempted
to marry, each other by a marriage solemnized in apparent compliance with law,
although the attempted marriage is or could be declared invalid, and either of the
following is true:
(1) With his consent, he is named as the child's father on the child's birth certificate.
(2) He is obligated to support the child under a written voluntary promise or by court
order.
(d) He receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural
child.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 761 l(c)-(d) (West 2004). Anthony signed a voluntary declaration of paternity,
married the mother, and lived with the mother and the child. GabrielP., 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 439-40.
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The California courts, in the line of cases that started with In re
Nicholas H 210 and In re Jesusa V.,21 1 have done what Michael H. did
not; they have modernized family understandings to channel family
relationships into a two parent model, albeit one that relies less directly
on marriage.2 12 In doing so, they implicitly recognize the mother's
enhanced decision-making role-Anthony could establish a relationship
with the child only because Suedi permitted it. 213 At the same time, the
decision also recognizes the fact that Anthony, not Gabriel, is the one
who stepped forward to assume the father's role.21 4 In other cases, the
California courts have recognized that the biological father who
establishes a relationship with the child is entitled to constitutional
protection, even if the mother reconciles with the husband to whom she
was married at the time of conception and birth. 215 The result ratifies the
parties' decisions, protecting intact relationships without denying the
fact of biological paternity, and granting those who establish a
relationship with the child security if the mother later changes her mind.
While, as a practical matter, these cases often protect husbands in
intact relationships who have assumed a parental role, the California
courts have extended recognition on a similar basis to same-sex partners
and the unmarried more generally. 2 16 In doing so, they have articulated a
While the trial court set aside the declaration in light of the paternity tests showing Gabriel to be the
biological father, the appellate court emphasized that Anthony might still be a presumed father
under subsections (c) or (d) above, and if so, the court could choose between the two presumed
fathers in light of all of the circumstances. Id. at 440, 446-47. See also From Partnersto Parents
Revisited, supra note 200, at 25-26 for a fuller explanation of the case.
210. 46 P.3d 932 (Cal. 2002).
211. 85 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004).
212. See In reJesusa V., 85 P.3d at 13, 15 (stating that biological paternity does not necessarily
rebut another man's presumption, depending instead on all the circumstances of the case); In re
Nicholas H., 46 P.3d at 933-34 (finding that the ex-husband, who was not the biological father, still
established parental rights over the child because he received the child into his home and held the
child out as his own). The California legislature also updated the marital presumption statute to
permit the mother greater latitude in rebutting the presumption of paternity. See CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 7541(c) ("The notice of motion for blood tests under this section may be filed by the mother of the
child not later than two years from the child's date of birth if the child's biological father has filed
an affidavit with the court acknowledging paternity of the child.").
213. See Gabriel P., 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 439 (noting that the mother, Suedi, allowed Anthony,
the non-biological father, to live with her, accompany her to the hospital, and voluntarily declare
paternity). See, e.g., H.S. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d 723, 726 (Ct. App. 2010)
(recognizing that the statute does "allow the mother and her husband to prevent the biological father
from ever establishing parental rights over a child").
214. See GabrielP., 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 447.
215. See Brian C. v. Ginger K., 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 294, 297, 310-11 (Ct. App. 2000) (upholding
the right of the biological father-who had lived with the mother and child and established a
parental relationship with the child-to rebut the marital presumption).
216. See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 665, 670 (Cal. 2005); In re Nicholas
H., 46 P.3d at 934, 937.
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new set of family norms, ones that connect the continued vitality of the
marital presumption-which California still recognizes217-to the
assumption of the functional role of parenthood. The courts have thus
given new meaning to the institutions Schneider celebrated-meanings
that permit some recognition of family differences that reflect class and
gender-but in terms unlikely to translate well in other parts of the
country. The channelling function may be dead at the national level, but
it shows occasional signs of life in the states.21 8
VI.

CONCLUSION

In the country as a whole, the marital presumption no longer serves
as an umbrella for decisions linking marriage and parenthood because
the presumption no longer has a single meaning. In Michael H., the
Court observed that the "facts of this case are, we must hope,
extraordinary. 2 19 Justice Scalia then went on to describe Gerald, Carole,
and Michael's lives--Carole, an international model, traveled back and
forth to Europe, and lived at various times not only with Gerald and
Michael, but Scott, who has no other relationship to the case except to
allow Justice Scalia to denigrate Carole.2 2 ° Yet, by the end of the recital
in the plurality opinion, the most remarkable fact may well be that at the
time of Victoria's eighth birthday, Carole and Gerald were still married,
living together, and jointly caring for their children.22'

In contrast, in the cases that tied the Kentucky courts in knots, the
parties married, separated, had affairs with others, reconciled, and
ultimately divorced.222 While these opinions provide fewer details about
217. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(c).
218. Naomi Cahn and I have argued elsewhere that cultural articulation in times of division
needs to be decentralized and that some states have managed to articulate emergent family norms
better than others. See RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES, supra note 28, at 151-52. Among the
greatest contrasts in these terms are those between Alabama and Arkansas on the issue of custody.
Chief Justice Moore (the "Ten Commandments" judge who was ultimately removed from the
bench) staked out such an absolutist position on sexual morality that the Alabama Supreme Court
has been reluctant to address the issue ever since, deferring instead to trial court findings of fact. Id.
at 149-50. In contrast, the Arkansas Supreme Court, while insisting that non-marital cohabitation
"cannot be abided," has guided the trial court to positions that uphold a shared sense of the
importance of marriage balanced against the best interest of children in ways that promote shared
sentiments. Id. at 146-47 (intemal quotation marks omitted).
219. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 113 (1989).
220. Id. at 113-14 (referring to the fact that "Carole left Michael and returned to California,
where she took up residence with yet another man, Scott K.").
221. See Schneider, supra note 1, at 525.
222. See, e.g., Smith v. Garber, No. 2009-SC-000738-MR, 2010 WL 6815999, at *1 (Ky. June
22, 2010). Indeed, the Kentucky Supreme Court finally disavowed its earlier decisions limiting
rebuttal of the marital presumption. In doing so, the court observed that, historically, "paternity
litigation existed almost exclusively to enable a man (or his estate) to disavow an alleged paternal
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the parties' backgrounds, it seems safe to conclude that they do not
involve international models, whose boyfriends travel between their
homes in the United States and business interests in the Caribbean while
their husbands move to New York and visit on occasional weekends.
Accordingly, underlying assumptions about the stability of the
relationships, the permanence of the husband's commitment to the child,
the biological father's motivation in seeking recognition, and the
consequences for the channelling effect of the cases vary considerably.
Yet, Schneider is right-the challenge for the channelling function
is to retain the "normative core" that marks the continuing value of
institutions such as marriage and parenthood. 223 It is hard to imagine a
couple more different from Gerald and Carole than Anthony and Suedi.
Suedi was approximately fifteen when she became pregnant and she
married Anthony almost a year after the birth of the child at issue in the
paternity dispute.224 Yet, in both cases the mother chose one man over
another and did so at least in part because the man she chose expressed a
credible commitment to her and the child.225 Whatever else has changed
with the passage of time, the fact that Gerald and Anthony married-and
stayed married-to the mother expresses that commitment. In Texas and
Iowa, in contrast, the decisions do not consider either the father's or the
husband's demonstrated commitment to mother or child; the normative
core of those rulings instead rests on the obligations that follow from
conception and birth, and the principle obligation among them is the
mother's duty to permit and perhaps encourage the biological father's
relationship with the child. Taking these opinions together, it is
impossible to fashion either a clear or clearly expressed normative
foundation for the relationship between marriage and parenthood.
The challenge for the channelling function, if it is to remain an
integral part of the family law canon, is to find ways to reaffirm the
relationship between commitment and parenthood in terms that are
comprehensible to each new generation. To do so, the law must engage
the emergent norms that underlie the practices in these cases-the
channelling function cannot survive judicial determination to fix the
meaning of living institutions in 1787.

responsibility or to force him to accept paternal responsibility. Only in the last quarter of the
twentieth century did we begin to see cases involving men seeking to acknowledge and accept
paternal obligation." J.A.S. v. Bushelman, 342 S.W.3d 850, 852-53 (Ky. 2001).
223. See Schneider, supra note 1, at 519.
224. Gabriel P. v. Suedi D., 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 437, 439-40 (Ct. App. 2006).
225. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 113-15; Gabriel P., 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 439-40. Gabriel, unlike
Anthony, refused to marry Suedi. GabrielP., 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 439-40. We do not know whether
Michael made a similar proposal to Carole.
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